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TORT LAW (LEGAL MALPRACTICE)-Attorneys May
Owe a Duty to Statutory Beneficiaries Regardless of
Privity: Leyba v. Whitley
I. INTRODUCTION
In Leyba v. Whitley,' the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an
attorney handling a wrongful death case may owe a duty of reasonable
care to the statutory beneficiaries to protect and maximize their interest
in any proceeds obtained. The court did not require privity of contract
between the attorney and the statutory beneficiary. 2 Instead, it adopted
a multi-factor balancing test, prefaced by a threshold question of intent
to benefit the plaintiff, to determine duty.' This Note examines the tests
used to determine if an attorney owes a duty to a non-client, analyzes
the Leyba decision, and discusses its implications for attorneys.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Phillip Urioste died in February, 1990. 4 His mother, Corrine Urioste,
hired attorney Joseph E. Whitley to pursue an action against several
medical care providers. Whitley had Corrine appointed as personal representative of her son's estate. He associated with attorney Daniel W.
Shapiro to pursue wrongful death claims.' Prior to commencing a wrongful
death action, Whitley and Shapiro secured a settlement in March, 1991
for over $500,000. Before settlement of the wrongful death claim, the
attorneys determined that Candace Leyba's six-month child, Phillip LeRoy
Urioste, was the sole statutory beneficiary of Phillip Urioste. 6 Phillip had
fathered two other children who had been adopted by others prior to
his death. The court did not review whether the right to the wrongful
death proceeds of these two children survived their adoption. 7
Whitley and Shapiro distributed the net settlement proceeds directly to
Corrine in three separate checks all made payable only to "Corrine
1. 120 N.M. 768, 907 P.2d 172 (1995).
2. Id. at 774, 907 P.2d at 178.
3. Id. at 775, 907 P.2d at 179.
4. Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this opinion are set out in Leyba, 120 N.M. at 76971, 907 P.2d at 173-75.
5. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). New Mexico's Wrongful Death
Act allows for a personal injury claim to survive the death of the injured. N.M. STAT. AfqN. § 412-1. The Act requires that even such action "shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative or representatives of such deceased person." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3.
6. New Mexico's Wrongful Death Act states: "[P]roceeds of any judgment obtained .. . shall
be distributed as follows: . .. if there be no husband or wife, but a child or children, . . . then
to such child or children ...." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3. Phillip LeRoy was born nearly seven
months after Phillip died. Leyba, 120 N.M. at 770, 907 P.2d at 174.
7. See, e.g., J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Child adopted by another as beneficiary of action
or settlement for wrongful death of natural parent, 67 A.L.R. 2d. 745 (1959) (discussing whether
the right to wrongful death proceeds survive the adoption of children and Rust v. Holland, 146
N.E.2d 82 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1957), reprinted in 67 A.L.R. 2d 739).
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Urioste." The checks contained no annotation that they were paid to
Corrine as fiduciary for Phillip LeRoy. Corrine spent more than $300,000
of the proceeds on herself and others. Of the total settlement, she reserved
only $20,000 for Phillip LeRoy.
Candace Leyba is the mother and conservator of Phillip LeRoy Urioste.
She commenced an action against Whitley and Shapiro in an attempt to
recover the wrongful death proceeds for her infant son.
At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence on the question of
whether Whitley and Shapiro had advised Corrine of her fiduciary obligations. Corrine testified she believed the money was hers. Leyba presented testimony in which Corrine stated that Whitley had told her the
money belonged to her. She also presented evidence that Whitley had
prepared a contract for Corrine to purchase a mobile home which included
a clause making Corrine's performance contingent upon a wrongful death
recovery. Whitley and Shapiro, in their defense, presented sworn statements that they had advised Corrine the money was not hers and that
other persons had advised Corrine of her fiduciary status. It was undisputed, however, that Whitley and Shapiro did not provide Corrine
with written advice or instructions regarding her fiduciary obligations in
connection with the settlement proceeds.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Whitley and
Shapiro. "[T]he Court of Appeals held that the attorneys did not owe
a duty directly to Phillip LeRoy [Urioste] to ensure that he receive[d]
the settlement proceeds." ' The Court of Appeals stated, however, that
Whitley and Shapiro owed a duty to their client, Corrine Urioste, to
inform her that the money did not belong to her and that she had a
fiduciary duty to distribute it to the child. 9 As a result, "[t]he attorneys
1
would be liable to the child if they breached this duty to their client."'
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the issue
of whether the attorneys directly owed the statutory beneficiary a duty
of reasonable care to protect his right to receive the net settlement proceeds
of the wrongful death action. The supreme court held that the public
policy of New Mexico supports a duty owed by the attorneys directly
to the statutory beneficiary in a wrongful death action."
III.

BACKGROUND

Wrongful Death Actions in New Mexico
New Mexico has recognized an action for wrongful death since 1882.12
The Wrongful Death Statute provides a cause of action to listed beneA.

8. Leyba, 120 N.M. at 770, 907 P.2d at 174 (citing Leyba v. Whitley, 118 N.M. 435, 438-40,
882 P.2d 26, 29-31 (Ct. App. 1994), rev'd, 120 N.M. 768, 907 P.2d 172 (1995)).
9. Leyba, 118 N.M. at 445, 882 P.2d at 36.
10. Leyba, 120 N.M. at 770, 907 P.2d at 174.
11. Id.
12. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1.
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ficiaries of a decedent when death prevents the injured party from maintaining the action. 3 The Wrongful Death Statute also promotes safety
of life and limb by making negligence costly to the wrongdoer. 4 Since
one purpose of the Wrongful Death Statute is to punish wrongdoers,
there is no requirement of pecuniary injury to a statutory beneficiary,
nor is there a requirement to have a statutory beneficiary at all. 5
The wrongful death act, which we have characterized as a survival
statute, provides a cause of action for the benefit of the statutory
beneficiaries to sue a tortfeasor for the damages, measured by the
value of the decedent's life, which the decedent himself would have
been entitled to recover had death not ensued.' 6
An action under the Wrongful Death Statute may be brought only by
a personal representative.' 7 New Mexico courts have construed broadly
who may serve as a personal representative and bring suit, but it is
typically the administrator of the estate of the deceased.,8 The personal
representative is only a nominal party, whom the Legislature selected to
act as the statutory trustee for the individual statutory beneficiaries. 19
The personal representative may or may not have an interest in the
proceeds of the wrongful death action.
B.

Erosion of the Privity Requirement for Legal Malpractice Actions
Traditionally, only a client could bring a malpractice action against
an attorney. 20 An attorney was not liable for non-intentional 2 harms he
may have caused to non-clients while representing

a client. 22 Courts

regarded privity of contract as a requirement of liability in a malpractice
action. 2 The United States Supreme Court first articulated this rule in
Savings Bank v. Ward.24 In Ward, the United States Supreme Court held
that an attorney was not liable to non-client lenders, who, in reliance
upon the attorney's title opinion, had suffered financial loss.

25

The at-

torney was not liable because no privity of contract existed, nor was
there any evidence of fraud or collusion. 26

13. See supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 350-51, 467 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1970).
15. See Hogsett v. Hanna, 41 N.M. 22, 29-30, 63 P.2d 540, 544-45 (1936).
16. Solon v. Wek Drilling Co., 113 N.M. 566, 568, 829 P.2d 645, 647 (1992).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3. See also supra note 5.
18. See Chavez v. Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 103 N.M. 606, 609, 711 P.2d 883,
886 (1985).
19. See Dominguez v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 605, 608, 673 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 421 (1983).
20. See I RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.1, at 360 (3d ed.
1989).
21. Attorneys could be held liable to non-clients for intentional torts and in contract. See id.
§ 6, at 285.
22. See id. § 7.4, at 365.
23. Id. § 7.2, at 361.
24. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
25. Id. at 205-06.
26. Id. See also Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (Justice Cardozo refused
to expand privity in a case involving accountants, explaining that privity was intended to prevent
unlimited liability to an indeterminate class of individuals.).
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While many jurisdictions still articulate the general rule that an attorney
owes a duty only to his client, "the vast majority of modern decisions
have favored expanding privity beyond the confines of the attorney-client
relationship where the plaintiff was intended to be the beneficiary of the
lawyer's retention." ' 27 To recognize this duty, courts utilize balancing tests
such as the California multi-factor balancing test or the third-party
beneficiary test. 28 Regardless of the approach used, courts have held there
29
must be a basis for a duty between the plaintiff and the attorney.
The California multi-factor balancing test was established by the Cal30
ifornia Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm. This six-criteria test, premised
upon public policy considerations, is used to determine whether a duty
exists to a third person. The six criteria are as follows: (1) the extent
to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury, (5) the policy of preventing future
harm, and (6) whether recognition of liability under the circumstances
3
would impose an undue burden on the profession. Many jurisdictions
have adopted this approach to 2determine duty in a variety of contexts
not involving legal malpractice.
While many of these jurisdictions have not yet applied this test, in
cases of professional malpractice liability to third parties, the balancing
factors have been favorably discussed as likely to have future application
to attorneys and other professionals.33 The California approach is premised34
policy;
upon a duty imposed by the judiciary as a matter of public
contractual privity rights are, therefore, superfluous to the obligation.
Under the third-party beneficiary approach, conversely, the determinative question is whether both the attorney and the client intended the
plaintiff to be the beneficiary of legal services. 35 The parties' intent, rather
than judicial notions of public policy, determines whether the non-client
may successfully sue the attorney. Thus, for courts adopting the thirdparty beneficiary test,3 6 the determinative question is whether the principal
is to benefit the non-client.37 An
purpose of the attorney's services
38
incidental benefit will not suffice.

27. MALLEN & SmiTH, supra note 20, § 7.10, at 379.
28. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text.
29. MALLEN & ShiTH, supra note 20, § 7.11, at 381.
30. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
31. Id. at 687-88.
32. See MALLEN & SMrH, supra note 20, § 7.11, at 383 n.5 (states that have adopted the
- California approach include Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Mississippi, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin).
33. See id.§ 7.11, at 384.
34. Id. § 7.11, at 383.
35. Id. § 7.11, at 385.
36. This test is utilized primarily by Illinois and Florida. See id.§ 7.11, at 384 n.8.
37. MALLEN & ShTH, supra note 20, § 7.11, at 384.
38. Id. § 7.11, at 385.
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The Supreme Court of Washington found that absent privity of contract,
Washington courts had applied both tests to ascertain if an attorney
owed a duty to a non-client.3 9 In order to clarify its law on the recognition
of an attorney's duty to a non-client, the Washington Supreme Court
4
created its own variation of the California multi-factor balancing test. 0
In Leyba v. Whitley, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted this test
1
for an attorney's duty to a non-client. 4
1. Washington's Approach for Recognizing a Duty to a Non-Client
In Trask v. Butler,4 2 the Supreme Court of Washington melded the
California multi-factor balancing test and the third-party beneficiary test
to determine if an attorney owed a duty to a non-client. 43 The Washington
Supreme Court stated both tests were created to determine whether an
attorney owes a duty to a non-client and both tests focus on the purpose
of establishing the attorney-client relationship. 44
The Trask court then created and adopted a "modified multi-factor
balancing test." '45 The court applied a threshold inquiry as to whether
the plaintiff is an intended beneficiary of the transaction to which the
advice pertained. 6 The court emphasized the need for an intended, rather
than incidental, beneficiary. 47 If there is no intent to benefit the nonclient, then no duty exists, and the multi-factor test elements are not
examined. 48 If there is an intent to benefit the third-party, then the
remaining factors are examined: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (3)
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury, (4) the policy of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent to
which the profession would be unduly burdened by a finding of liability. 49
2. Defining "Intent to Benefit the Plaintiff"
Courts have repeatedly stated, regardless of which theory is used to
ascertain a duty to a non-client, "the determinative question is, did both
the attorney and the client intend the plaintiff to be the beneficiary of
legal services?" 50 The test is "whether the intent to benefit actually existed,
not whether there could have been an intent to benefit the third party."'"
Courts have been more willing to establish a duty, premised upon intent,

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 1084.
120 N.M. 768, 775, 907 P.2d 172, 179 (1995).
872 N.M. 1080 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d at 1084.
MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 20, § 7.11, at 385.
Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985).
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such as drafting wills for the benefit of
in non-adversarial proceedings
52
intended beneficiaries.
While no jurisdiction has specifically defined "intent to benefit," an
attorney could contract with the paying client as to whom the intended
beneficiary of the action is. The attorney then would know to whom a
duty was owed besides the client. Examples of situations in which courts
have held an attorney did not have a duty to a third-party because there
was no intent to benefit include the following: an action brought by
mortgagor home purchasers involving an attorney hired to represent the
mortgagee in a home purchase;5 3 an action brought by one of several
54
incorporators against an attorney representing only one incorporator;
and an action brought by wives of clients against attorney for advising
clients to sign loan documents for a second mortgage on their residences."
In addition, it has been held that an attorney does not owe a duty to6
unnamed members of a class action where the class was never certified.1
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE LEYBA COURT

The Leyba court found an attorney pursuing a wrongful death action
may have a duty to the beneficiaries of the action. 7 Recognition Of duty
is a question of law and based upon policy considerations. 8 The court
stated New Mexico's public policy supports recognition of a duty owed
by attorneys to statutory beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. 9 The°
court then examined New Mexico tort law for professional malpractice.
New Mexico tort law recognizes "an attorney's duty to provide professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence of attorneys of
ordinary skill and capacity." ' 6' In Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick,
Forbes, Caraway & Tabor,62 the court stated in order to recover on a
claim for legal malpractice based upon negligence, a plaintiff must prove
three elements: (1) the employment of the defendant attorney; (2) the

52. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (Ill.
1982).
53. See Flaherty, 492 A.2d at 629.
54. See Torres v. Divis, 494 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
55. See York v. Stiefel, 458 N.E.2d 488, 492-93 (Il1. 1983).
56. See Formento v. Joyce, 522 N.E.2d 312, 316 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988).
57. Leyba v. Whitley, 120 N.M. 768, 770, 907 P.2d 172, 174 (1995).
58. See id. at 771, 907 P.2d at 175 (citing Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 N.M.
671, 672, 687 P.2d 728, 729 (1984) (emphasizing that while the question of negligence is for the
jury, the issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law for the judge to decide); Calkins v.
Cox Estates, 110 N.M. 59, 62, 792 P.2d 36, 39 (1990) (finding that public policy supported the
recognition of a duty owed by a landlord to a child tenant for failure to maintain playground
fences in a wrongful death action). See also Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 894 P.2d 386 (1995);
Madrid v. Lincoln County Medical Center, ____N.M. __
, 909 P.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1995), cert.
granted, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009 (1995).
59. Leyba, 120 N.M. at 771, 907 P.2d at 175.
60. See id.at 772, 907 P.2d at 176.
61. Id. (citing Hyden v. Law Firm of McCormick, Forbes, Caraway & Tabor, 115 N.M. 159,
162-63, 848 P.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 60, 846 P.2d 1069 (1993)).
62. 115 N.M. 159, 848 P.2d 1086 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 60, 846 P.2d 1069 (1993).
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defendant attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the negligence
63
resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the plaintiff.
Before Hyden, the New Mexico Supreme Court already had applied
a multi-factor balancing test in a professional malpractice case.64 In
Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Construction,65 the court eliminated the
privity of contract requirement and applied an early version of the
California multi-factor test for liability on a negligence theory.6 The
Steinberg court allowed a subsequent homeowner to recover from a
building contractor damages
still covered under a warranty given to the
67
original homeowner.

In Wisdom v. Neal,68 a malpractice action, the Federal District Court
of New Mexico, interpreting what it perceived to be New Mexico law,
concluded that a lawyer's duty to a non-client would be recognized in
New Mexico. 69 Judge Bratton applied the Steinberg multi-factor balancing
test

70

and held that New Mexico law permitted the beneficiaries of a will

to sue a lawyer who had incorrectly
distributed the property of an estate
7
per stirpes instead of per capita. '

In Leyba, the Supreme Court of New Mexico examined New Mexico
case law and the case law of other jurisdictions on duty in a professional
context and found that recognizing a lawyer's duty to a non-client in a
wrongful death action is a logical step in New Mexico law. 72 The court
found the Supreme Court of Washington's test, set forth in Trask v.
Butler, for an attorney's duty to a non-client to be the most useful for
73
determining an attorney's duty to a non-client in a wrongful death action.
The court stated that "[t]he authority of a personal representative to
bring suit for wrongful death stems solely from the Wrongful Death Act
... and the personal representative's sole task under that Act is to
distribute any recovery in strict accordance with the statute. 7 4 Because
the personal representative has no fiduciary interest in the action, "there
can be no other purpose of an attorney-client agreement to pursue claims
for wrongful death than to benefit those persons specifically designated
'75
by the Act as statutory beneficiaries.

63. Id. at 162-63, 848 P.2d at 1089-90. The second element is proven through expert testimony
that services were below the standard of an attorney of ordinary skill and capacity. Hyden, 115
N.M. at 163, 848 P.2d at 1090.
64. See Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Constr., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 798 (1968).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 124-25, 440 P.2d at 799-800 (citing Stewart v. Cox, 362 P.2d 345 (Cal. 1961) (en
banc) (finding that liability is a matter of policy and involves a balancing of factors)).
67. Id. at 124, 440 P.2d at 799.
68. 568 F. Supp. 4 (D. N.M. 1982).
69. Id.
70. See id. at 7-8.
71. Id.
72. Leyba v. Whitley, 120 N.M. 768, 775, 907 P.2d 172, 179 (1995).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 776, 907 P.2d at 180 (citing Henkel v. Hood, 49 N.M. 45, 47, 156 P.2d 790, 791
(1945)).
75. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

The court did recognize and adopt an "adversarial exception" to an
attorney's duty to a non-client.7 6 The court refused to find that a duty
was owed to a non-client when the owing of such a duty would detract
7
from the attorney's ethical obligation to act as an advocate for his client."
The court stated that, in a wrongful death action, public policy prevents
recognition of a duty to a non-client when recognition would burden the
attorney's relationship with the client.7 8 The New Mexico Supreme Court
previously had recognized the inappropriateness of an attorney owing a
duty to an adverse party. 7 9 In Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin
& Robb,80 the court stated:
An attorney has no duty however to protect the interests of a nonclient adverse party for the obvious reasons that the adverse party is
not the intended beneficiary of the attorney's services and that the
An adverse
attorney's undivided loyalty belongs to the client ....
party cannot justifiably rely on the opposing lawyer to protect him
from harm .... .1
THE IMPACT OF THE LEYBA DECISION UPON
PRACTITIONERS
The decision in Leyba broadens the scope of an attorney's liability for
malpractice. First, the court imposed additional duties and burdens on
practitioners pursuing wrongful death actions. Second, the court strongly
implied that attorneys representing parents or a "next friend" in an82
action involving a child additionally would owe a duty to that child.
Third, the court will likely hold that an attorney has a duty to a beneficiary
of a will.
V.

A. Obligations and Burdens on PractitionersPursuing Wrongful
Death Actions
An attorney pursuing a wrongful death action involving multiple beneficiaries is obligated to look for and identify potential conflicts among
beneficiaries. 83 An attorney owes a duty to all of the beneficiaries, unless
an adversarial relationship develops and the attorney84 expressly tells the
adversarial parties he can no longer represent them.
1. Potential Adversarial Relationships
The potential for an existing or future adversarial relationship amongst
statutory beneficiaries is likely. The Leyba court failed to consider the
76. See id.
77. Id. (citing Trask v. Butler, 872 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Wash. 1994) (en banc)).
78. Leyba, 120 N.M. at 778, 907 P.2d at 182.
79. See Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, 106 N.M. 757, 761, 750 P.2d 118,
122 (1988).
80. Id.
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. See Leyba, 120 N.M. at 776 n.5, 907 P.2d at 180 n.5.
83. Id. at 776. 907 P.2d at 180.
84. Id. at 778, 907 P.2d at 182.
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complexity of relationships among multiple statutory beneficiaries. For
example, a common, potentially adversarial, scenario exists when a mother/
wife is a wrongful death action beneficiary and is interested in the funds
to pay off debts, while one of her children, who is also a beneficiary,
needs funds to provide for her well-being, and another child-beneficiary
needs funds for higher education. All are beneficiaries and all have
different, and possibly competing, needs. An attorney may be able to
represent only one of these clients due to the clients' potentially adversarial
relationship to each other arising from differing interests in the wrongful
death action.
If an adversarial relationship could potentially develop between statutory
beneficiaries, must an attorney always assume the existence of a conflict
and plan his representation to include only the personal representative
at the beginning of an action? If a separate attorney is required for each
statutory beneficiary, the financial incentives for an attorney to handle
a wrongful death action for a client who may receive one-third or less
of the total proceeds may diminish. If a practitioner initially represents
the personal representative and all of the beneficiaries harmoniously and
then later becomes enmeshed in their adversarial relationships, can the
practitioner withdraw at this time? The attorney who continues to represent
one of the clients in a conflicted action also may have problems arising
from any information he learned previously that is protected under the
attorney-client privilege. Unfortunately, the Lebya decision does not give
any guidance for handling these dilemmas.
The Leyba court did define the "adversarial exception" as a solution
to potential conflicts arising under circumstances involving personal representatives who may not be statutory beneficiaries and children who are
the only beneficiaries.85 In many wrongful death cases, however, there
are several statutory beneficiaries, with one of them serving as the personal
representative. As indicated above, each beneficiary is likely to have
different needs and expectations from a wrongful death action, resulting
in an adversarial relationship.
In Klancke v. Smith,8 6 the Colorado Court of Appeals, confronted
with a similar case involving several adversarial beneficiaries, declined to
recognize a duty owed by attorneys to the non-client statutory beneficiaries
in a wrongful death action.87 In this case, an adversarial relationship
developed to such an extent that an attorney could not have represented
both the personal representative and the other statutory beneficiaries. 88
The Leyba court considered Klancke in reaching its decision, but found
that the adoption of an "adversarial exception" in Leyba would cover
factual situations similar to those presented in Klancke.8 9 In any case

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See id. at 778, 907 P.2d at 182.
829 P.2d 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, ___P.2d
Id. at 467.
See id. at 466.
Leyba, 120 N.M. at 777, 907 P.2d at 181.

-(1992).
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involving multiple beneficiaries, however, the "adversarial exception" will
likely become the norm.
2. Steps an Attorney Must Take After the Recognition of an
Adversarial Relationship
If the attorney needs to utilize the "adversarial exception" to eliminate
a duty to a third-party, the Leyba court provided very specific guidance
for terminating this duty. The court stated that an attorney's duty to a
third party ends only upon communication by the attorney to the third
party where the "third party knows or should know that he or she
cannot rely on the attorney to act for his or her benefit." 9 Thus, in
order to terminate a duty to the third party, the attorney must first,
identify the conflict and second, communicate explicitly to the third party
that he or she can no longer rely on the attorney for representation.
3. An Attorney May Use Contract to Define a Duty
An attorney can contract with the client and explicitly define who the
intended beneficiary of the action is. The Leyba court's decision to adopt
a balancing test to determine duty absent privity of contract, is premised
on the requirement of a "mutual intent of the attorney and client to
benefit" the third party. 9' Thus, by contracting with the client, the attorney
will know specifically to whom he owes a duty. An attorney may create
an ethical problem, however, if he is contracting to protect his best
interests in regard to potential duties to third parties at the expense of
his duty to his client and his client's interests.
Even if an attorney contractually determined the intended beneficiary,
he still may not owe a duty to the statutory beneficiary. The Leyba court
adopted a modified multi-factor balancing test. 92 "Intent to benefit" is
the threshold, followed by a balancing of the remaining factors to determine if a duty is owed to the non-client. 93 Those remaining factors
are the following: (1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the
degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (3) the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury; (4) the
policy of preventing future harm; and (5) the extent to which the profession
would be unduly burdened by a finding of liability. 94
Actions Involving Parents or "Next Friend"
The Leyba court stated that "an attorney who agrees to represent a
parent or next friend in pursuit of a cause of action for a child" would
likely owe a duty to the child. 95 Since the child is the beneficiary of the
B.

90. Id. at 778,
91. Id. at 776,
92. See id. See
93. Id. at 775,
94. Leyba, 120
text.
95. Leyba, 120

907 P.2d at 182.
907 P.2d at 180.
also supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
907 P.2d at 179.
N.M. at 775, 907 P.2d at 179. See also supra notes 42-48 and accompanying
N.M. at 776 n.5, 907 P.2d at 180 n.5.
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action, where the parents are the clients, the attorney must now ensure
that any action is also in the best interest of the child.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals examined attorney malpractice in
an action on behalf of a child in Collins ex rel. Collins v. Perrine.9
Collins involved an action against several hospitals for severe, permanent
damage to an infant caused by delayed diagnosis and treatment of spinal
meningitis.9 7 The attorney settled part of the case on behalf of the child
with approval of the parents as guardians and clients for a paltry sum.98
The court found the attorney liable to the parents for negligently settling
the case, despite the fact the parents had approved the settlement.9 The
Leyba court's reference to an attorney's duty to the child of such an
action is a recognition of the principles used to decide Perrine.
C. Action Involving Beneficiaries of a Will
While the Leyba court adopted the modified multi-factor test for
wrongful death, it did not disapprove of the holding by the federal district
court in Wisdom v. Neal for legal malpractice in a negligently drafted
will.100 If a similar fact pattern for a negligently drafted will arose in a
New Mexico state court today, that court's application of the test for
duty adopted by Leyba would undoubtedly hold an attorney liable to a
third-party beneficiary of a negligently drafted will. Applying the threshold
"mutual intent to benefit the third party" test, 0' a court would find
that the purpose of a client engaging a lawyer to draft a will is to benefit
the intended beneficiaries of the will. A balancing of the remaining factors
would strongly conclude the attorney owes a duty to the third party.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Leyba, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that an attorney owes
a duty to a non-client in a wrongful death action absent an adversarial
relationship between the personal representative and the statutory beneficiary. The court stated a duty also would be recognized in "next
friend" suits and other statutory rights. The court left the door open
to further expand an attorney's duty to a non-client. This holding requires
practitioners to carefully examine their relationships with clients and nonclients who stand to directly benefit from the services the attorney is
providing to the client.
MARIANNE B. HILL
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